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Abstract 
This paper analyses mechanisms for reacting to migration associated with 
environmental shocks. It responds primarily to recent calls for 
mainstreaming migration into environmental disaster risk reduction and 
climate change adaptation. The principles suggested here are applicable to 
those who move, host or stay behind. Based on a multiple sector and inter-
disciplinary perspective, the human impact of environmental shocks can be 
mitigated through appropriate technologies and awareness, civil societal 
engagement and political commitment. Operational mechanisms include 
contingency planning, early warning, risk management, improved 
communication and the application of appropriate response standards. 
These are guided by on-going evaluation of human vulnerability and 
capacity, particularly amongst marginalised groups, also being applicable 
irrespective of limitations in ‘environmental migrant’ categorisation and 
quantification. Relocation in relation to environmental shocks is variably 
characterised by risk increase or reduction, adaptation and potential 
betterment or decline in well-being and security. However, complexity 
between type, location and timing of environmental shock, individual 
behaviour, cultural and political influences renders migration 
mainstreaming in disaster reduction an uncertain science and policy 
domain. It is noted in this respect that relocating or remaining in situ 
requires adaptation, depends on variable survival mechanisms and is 
subject to the power and control wielded over people’s lives by others. 
Findings from disaster reduction studies suggest that understanding 
decisions to migrate, stay behind, host supportively, engage migration 
policy and so forth, will involve understanding and respecting people’s 
varied aspirations for well-being. For the complex terrain of international 
and internal migration this will demand an approach beyond standard 
vulnerability or resilience assessments. The framework attempted suggests 
that simplification of human mechanisms of adaptation and reacting to 
environmental change remains largely unresolved, but some approaches 
flagged here can contribute much, being sensitised by principles of human 
rights, responsibilities and sustainable development more widely. 
Introduction: emergency management 
reactions in relation to migration  
Mechanisms for reacting to migration associated with environmental shocks depend on the 
nature of the hazards and vulnerabilities experienced over the immediate or long term. In this 
paper emphasis is put on ‘reactive involuntary non-administered displacement’ (Oliver-Smith, 
2006). The paper is largely a discussion extrapolated from a mix of involuntary migration and 
disaster reduction literatures. In this instance predominant themes in disaster risk reduction 
SR5 4
work are considered in the context of those who relocate from environmental crisis as internally 
displaced people or across national boundaries, those who chose to stay behind and those 
who host displaced people. 
The mechanisms in reacting to environmental shock include the activities of self-help that 
individuals, households or communities use to protect themselves in the face of adversity. In 
Bangladesh, rural communities in the exposed coastal zone apply techniques of mutual 
assistance before, during and after the onslaught of cyclones, including that which requires 
temporally altering local religious and cultural norms (Alam and Collins, 2010). It had also been 
noted by Zaman (1993) that 88% of people displaced from river deltas in Bangladesh migrated 
within 2 miles of displacement location, therefore emphasising localised adaptation. 
Reactions to environmental shock constitute what people do prior to the ‘shock’, during the 
event itself and post event. Migration over a short or long distance, or not at all, is one of the 
fundamental choices to be made. With adequate early warning, when people believe the 
message (Erwin-Atwood and Major, 1998), many will take action to protect themselves and 
their assets, though not necessarily complete removal from danger. As experienced in recent 
cyclones in both Bangladesh and the USA, the choice of reaction to remove from home may be 
mediated by the relative risk of loss of possessions, incapacity, or lack of a sense of need to 
detach. In other instances, warnings are not heeded on the basis that they were incorrect on 
previous occasions. In Bangladesh, not all people move to cyclone shelters on hearing of 
incoming cyclones because the shelter might be considered inadequate in terms of serving 
basic needs. People question how they can leave behind a much-loved cow, or ask themselves 
what would God’s will be regarding this oncoming threat. Meanwhile, in pastoralist area of 
Africa (Angola, Kenya, Tanzania and others) pastoralist communities have carried out their 
migrations in response to environmental change across seasons as part of normal living 
throughout the millennia. 
The propensity to adapt, be resilient and to preserve or pursue well-being lies at the heart of 
understanding mechanisms for reacting to environmental shocks. But what can this mean for 
migration as a mechanism at the global level? Much work of the development and relief 
agencies has been concentrated on reacting through international relief, often delivered to 
those who are refugees or internally displaced. However, the last two to three decades have 
also witnessed growth in awareness and attempted application of more preventative, risk- and 
development-orientated perspectives in disaster reduction, and this also implicates the type of 
mechanisms that can be explored in respect of reacting to disaster related migration issues. 
The conceptual and to some extent practical links here are now currently integrated by the 
International Organisation of Migration (IOM 2009; 2010). This integration of ideas and 
approaches is characteristic of many international organisations (particularly the UN) wishing to 
bring together awareness of sectoral issues (i.e. health, energy, gender, climate etc.) and 
concern about increases in environmental shocks and trends.  
However, from the perspective of many disaster-orientated scholars, this new level of 
engagement in theory and policy will need to include the view of disaster as both a calculated 
impact and the notion of ‘disaster’ as a relatively derived concept or construction (Quarentelli, 
1998). In the context of this paper I simplify, considering environmental shock, the migration 
that may result and the potential for either disaster or betterment of life as the experience of 
millions we may consider at direct risk of current environmental change. They are those living 
in low-lying areas of the world frequently subject to flooding, drought-stricken regions, seismic 
zones, and locations so impoverished by unsustainable development excesses that people 
survive conditions worse than not having a couple of dollars a day. However, there are 
currently no sound figures available to quantify how many of these migrate, stay behind or help 
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host others, and there remains some speculation as to whether environmental change is 
currently a key driver of migration at all. 
By migrant, therefore, in the first instance I simply refer to those who relocate as a result of an 
environmental event, be it climate, other hazard-induced or inappropriate development. These 
will in many instances also include those forced to flee due to conflict. In each instance 
adaptation to new environments is a matter of survival, with the intention of betterment. It is 
acknowledged that not all forms of migration can be addressed in this one short paper. 
However, with respect to recent calls for mainstreaming migration into environmental disaster 
risk reduction and climate change adaptation (IOM 2009, 2010), it is proposed here that the 
influences on migration reactions resulting from environmental shocks can be suitably analysed 
through the more people-centred emergency management principles. These involve those 
aspects of resilience building and adaptation that are emergent (in some cases resurgent) 
principles of disaster risk reduction more generally, being also applicable to, if not also sourced 
from, forced migration contexts where there can be an environmental driver. 
Environmental shocks, whether unfolding over short or long timeframes, activate reactions from 
individuals, communities and designated emergency response institutions. The outcomes are 
influenced by the nature of environmental events, the socioeconomic contexts within which 
they occur and the effectiveness of emergency management available. Slow-onset events, 
such as drought leading to famine, require the crossing of a critical threshold of observable 
human suffering and public communication before international reactions occur. Formalised 
response cultures vary, from ‘blue light’ services operational in developed regions, to 
international humanitarian relief that may get applied to the larger-scale emergency migrations 
anywhere. The military can be a prevalent component of emergency responses to 
environmental shocks. The media rallied to this point in 2010 in relation to military engagement 
of the USA following the Haitian earthquake and of the Pakistan army for the Indus mega-flood. 
Official relief reactions, whether formalised or not, are influenced by the representation of 
events as they unfold, as warranting the designation ‘disaster’ or not. Images of migrants from 
environmental shock stimulate relief reactions through the media for most major environmental 
events involving displacement of people or their assets. 
Systems of command and control are a common characteristic of official emergency response. 
For example, local- or national-level floods, veterinary disease epidemics or bombing 
campaigns trigger the UK’s ‘gold, silver and bronze’ system operational through a hierarchy of 
emergency decision making. Though contextually less relevant to the focus of this paper, the 
approach represented by such a system has resonance with global emergency reaction 
cultures. Larger droughts, earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, volcanoes, cyclones, hurricanes and 
other environmental disasters that produce population displacement usually stimulate both 
national- and international-level humanitarian reactions. Accompanying emergency 
management roles can involve evacuation of at risk people from hydrological, climatic and 
tectonic hazards, either short or long term, to areas where there is safety from an 
environmental event becoming a full-scale disaster. However, first migration responses from 
environmental shocks are usually a spontaneous self-preservation action of individuals, 
families and communities in the absence of official assistance or alternative options to stay. 
This is very apparent in response to rapid-onset events such as earthquakes, tidal waves, 
landslides and flash floods that occur over minutes. Slower-moving environmental events, such 
as a failing harvest, encroaching violence or economic destitution, also put people on the 
move, though the differentiation between being forced or there being a more voluntary decision 
to relocate is potentially a subjective classification. Cases of direct displacement through 
conflict are considered forced. The way in which a disaster designation can be appropriately 
applied has also been frequently contested (Quarantelli, 1998). In analysing environmental 
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shock-induced displacement and migration, the designation of a crisis or no crisis can therefore 
similarly be a matter of judgement. The discussion here is not solely of an academic milieu, but 
influences the nature of humanitarian reactions to environmental events. Misrepresentations of 
displacement crises equate to inappropriate reactions. 
There are no limits in terms of a timeframe for environmental events that cause relocation. 
‘Very slow-onset’ environmental crises or shocks, such as deforestation, or simply 
unsustainable development, also become accepted as a part of everyday life for those having 
to adapt to them. Whilst decisions to migrate are more obvious with the onset of an immediate 
shock, they may also result from several seasons of accumulated incidents (multiple shocks) or 
gradual deterioration of assets. Moreover, the definition of an environmental migrant with many 
potential variants of physical, economic and social environmental pressures, including through 
open conflict, indicates the categorisation difficulty. Consequently, mechanisms for reacting are 
subject to interpretation of the nature of the issue for which a reaction might occur. To explore 
much of the above further this paper now turns to some of the principles that can be applied to 
situations of real and perceived environmental pressure, and which can help address this 
conundrum. 
Migration and any related disaster information and awareness requires integrated analyses of 
multiple causes and reactions to environmental shocks, should these be the cause of 
displacement. Integrated models of displacement, such as Cernea’s (1997) ‘impoverishment, 
risk and livelihood reconstruction’ (IRLR) model, provide an explanation of vulnerability regards 
migrants in the resettlement process. However, approaches that apply from disaster 
management have also often been underpinned by vulnerability assessment including 
integrated emergency management (IEM) (McLoughlin, 1985; Tufekci, 1995; CCA, 2004), 
integrated disaster risk management (IDRiM) (Ammann, 2006; Amendola et al., 2008; Ikeda et 
al., 2008) and disaster and development approaches (Cuny, 1983; Collins, 2009a). These 
increasingly include (i) multi-sectored and interdisciplinary perspectives; (ii) recognition of civil 
societal mechanisms of engagement that take place beyond formalised emergency 
management; (iii) longer-term reactions beyond the immediate relief phase; and (iv) options of 
improved investment in prevention through risk reduction. They are considered alongside 
related operational mechanisms such as early warning, vulnerability and risk assessment 
(including resilience and capacity assessment), communication processes and response 
standards as likely principles for addressing migration reactions to environmental shock and 
reactions to migration resulting from environmental crises. The following sections review what 
these suggested aspects of environmental migration assessment and management mean in 
their operational management, rather than a panacea for this field of inquiry.  
Migration implications for environmental 
risk reduction and response 
Multi-sectored and interdisciplinary perspectives 
Multi-sectored reactions to environmental shocks involve varied strands of governance in 
aiming to coordinate and communicate outcomes of an event. For integrated emergency plans 
government departments with responsibilities in planning, infrastructure, finance, health, 
welfare, education, environment and trade are amongst those included alongside or within a 
disaster management coordinating body. However, emergency management planning 
intentions often struggle to deliver coordination prior to or during an environmental shock and 
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do not differentiate between potential internal migrants or refugees until after a major event 
(such as a flash flood or earthquake) has taken place. This can be observed for almost all 
recent disaster events involving mass displacement of people, from Haiti to Pakistan to Japan. 
A salient question here is therefore ‘how more integrated emergency management can better 
respond to contexts of multiple displacements and migrations from environmental shocks?’ 
Limitations in cross-sector emergency reactions where there is migration may be due to lines of 
communication not being well integrated between departments in advance, being under-
resourced or due to damage from the event itself. Beyond political infrastructure, multi-
sectoralism also implies technical and theoretical developments through interdisciplinary 
research, learning and capacity building. The academic sector recognises this demand 
(Alexander, 1997) since multi-causal environmental shocks and disasters draw from different 
knowledge environments. This is reflected across paradigms of disaster studies, from a focus 
on natural hazards (Smith, 2001; Smith and Petley, 2009), to the construction of disaster 
causality (Lupton, 1999; Bankhoff, 2001). It extends also from an emphasis on the production 
of human vulnerability (Bankoff et al., 2004; Wisner et al., 2004; Birkmann, 2006) to the current 
emphasis on resilience (Manyena, 2006; Paton and Johnston, 2006; King and Cottrell, 2007). 
Through these aspects, the study of disaster, development and associated displacement 
studies combine multiple streams of inquiry through integrated environmental, social and 
economic analyses, amongst others (Collins, 2009a). This includes notions of those enduring 
an environmental shock as survivors rather than victims, resilient rather than vulnerable, and 
desiring of well-being rather than just to cope. Beyond its immediate dimensions of people 
moving from one location to the other, migration becomes a mechanism or adaptive strategy 
through which these characteristics and aspirations get expressed.  
That people flee, travel, resettle and attempt to be accommodated in new settings under a wide 
range of circumstances demands a multi-sectored and interdisciplinary approach at field level 
should interventions be taking place. A process of on-going assessment of those displaced by 
an environmental shock, whether remaining in situ or relocating to another context and 
potentially being hosted by others, would form part of an integrated reaction to the adaptive 
migration effects of environmental shocks. 
Reactions beyond formalised emergency management 
Migration reactions to environmental shocks are almost never accompanied by formalised 
emergency management systems whilst people are in the act of initial flight from the event. 
Furthermore, civil societal reactions towards mutual assistance in disasters are under-
represented or overlooked in analyses of response mechanisms (Oliver-Smith, 1996). The gap 
here is widened further in that emergency management responses get evaluated through 
analysis of participating sectors based on their own learning cycles as official responders. This 
is characterised by closed-door ‘lessons learnt’ sessions that may take place post event to 
improve formalised reactions to the next event, usually without the participation of displaced 
survivors. 
Rapid response without knowledge of the situations confronted will be less effective than 
response involving prior experience and assessment of the situation (Price, 2006). However, 
by definition, a major disaster and the resultant population displacement it causes will have 
pushed the boundary of human capacity beyond regular limits. These present limitations in the 
reactions of formalised emergency response teams, but many more people engage in first 
response. First responders are those first on the scene of a crisis who set off a call for 
assistance, remove people from rubble and wreckage, enter dangerous environments to save 
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people and possessions, apply medical first aid and variously engage in other actions required 
during and immediately after major incidents. In the case of migrations from environmental 
change, first response can be measured in terms of those who help others relocate, those who 
stay behind and those who facilitate resettlement in hosting areas. In this sense both migrant 
and host may be a first responder. Citizen or otherwise identified independent first responders 
(Palen et al., 2007) represented the main reaction force when there were no emergency units 
available during the early stages of the earthquake at Sichuan, China, in 2009, the Haiti 
earthquake of 2010, flooding of Pakistan in 2010 and the Japan earthquake, tsunami and 
nuclear meltdown of 2011. Initial migration decisions in these events were without any, or little 
other, option based on a rapidly considered assessment of the situation by the displaced. 
However, questions arise as to why, when faced with significantly similar threats (i.e. villagers 
within the same area at risk), some chose to flee whilst others do not? Beyond physical ability, 
information availability and the presence of official emergency agents, socioeconomic, cultural 
and psychological reasons are relevant to addressing this. 
Early response, though not necessarily a first reaction, may include the setting up of reception 
areas for displaced people close to the point of environmental shock, as witnessed in Japan in 
2011 and previously in New Orleans, though in Japan a 20-km exclusion zone was set up 
around the Fukishima nuclear plant. Wider coordinated response then includes people 
migrating or being formally evacuated further afield, such as the relocation of a significant 
percentage of New Orleans residents to other parts of the United States. 
In rapid-onset emergencies, those in charge may call upon official citizen groups, for example 
the Citizen Corps in the USA, whilst unofficial citizen responders can be considered a 
hindrance to rescue services. The combination of moral and ethical demands to participate in 
disaster response weighed against value in community action is a potentially complex question. 
Meanwhile, for external responses, difficulties have been associated with unwanted forms of 
relief that crop up post disaster, exemplified by the case of relief to pastoralists (Kilby, 1993), 
and of food and medicine during the great flood of Mozambique (Christie and Hanlon, 2001). 
Impacts of inappropriate medical aid in emergency relief included the treatment of thousands of 
refugees from Rwanda residing at Goma displacement area, resulting in mass death (Goma 
Epidemiology Group, 1995). Inappropriate external intervention may contrast at times with 
often unrecognised, though appropriate, indigenous reactions to environmental shocks. The 
merits of indigenous practices have been realised (Mercer et al., 2010), in relation to cyclones 
(Alam and Collins, 2010), droughts (Richards, 1985), disease epidemic and so forth. There is 
also a call for increased recognition of the role of self-help approaches for disaster reduction 
more widely, referred to as self-care in the context of health disasters (Edgeworth and Collins, 
2006; Edgeworth, 2010).  
In that those migrating from environmental shocks may mean loss of livelihoods, reactions can 
be towards seeking ways of compensating a loss of income and other assets through 
emergency assistance, with the intention to recreate former livelihoods elsewhere post 
displacement. However, the reasons some people do not migrate away from an environmental 
impact can include the desire to hang on to the potential to rebuild a livelihood within the 
impact zone and to protect assets held there despite on-going risk. The act of staying behind to 
protect livelihood and capital assets is exemplified by those sitting it out with weapons in the 
upper rooms of their houses in New Orleans, people perched with their livestock in river islands 
of Pakistan and farmers continuing to produce unwanted food in zones evacuated through 
radiation risk in Japan.  
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Longer-term reactions 
Longer-term reactions and preparedness include potential migrants and people in hosting 
areas being aware of forthcoming crises in advance. This can then assist early preventative 
actions, the investment offsetting the impact of environmental shocks for future generations. 
Though seemingly idealistic when considering immediate reactions to crises, the theme of 
intergenerational justice, core to sustainable development, is particularly relevant to future 
protection, the precautionary principle (Harremoës, 2002) and the right not to have to flee the 
scene of former crimes. Longer periods are also necessary in addressing those directly injured 
or traumatised by environmental events, people not seen to visibly react in the short term. This 
requires understanding of complex human recovery and rehabilitation processes including what 
are considered psychosocial reactions to shocks manifest over a long period (NCPTSD, 2005; 
NICE, 2005). However, many of the assumptions concerning these impacts have been 
criticised because of a failure to understand human coping beyond medical diagnoses (often 
Western) of mental health (Ingleby, 2005; Jayawickrama, 2010). 
Mass slow-onset environmental events such as drought leading to displacement and forced 
migration, famine, infectious disease epidemics, economic collapse, societal breakdown or 
conflict require reactions that are long-term commitments to change. Emergency services 
generally remain inadequate in providing sufficiently long-term responses where mass 
casualties are less concentrated or less predictable. This is one of the driving aspects of a 
long-established call to link disaster relief with longer-term development actions (UNDP, 2004), 
and disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation and environmental migration (IOM, 
2009; 2010). The two-way linkage between disaster and development is also behind the drive 
to mainstream disaster reduction into development (DFID, 2005; 2006), get development out of 
disaster, address development-induced disaster, and other variants of this equation (Collins, 
2009a). Though an oversimplification in operational terms, it has become conceptually 
reasonable in a world of global and local environmental change to equate disaster reduction 
directly to sustainable development, as two sides of the same coin. Migration is often at the 
core of this equation as removal of people, either self-instigated or externally managed, from 
the place, time or lack of protection to environmental threats can defuse immediate risks. 
However, where resettlement is constrained in terms of regaining a livelihood and security, 
perpetuated conditions of displacement extends the effects of environmental shocks much 
further. The role of impoverishment through displacement is analysed in some detail by Cernea 
(2000, 2005) and others with reference to the impoverishment, risks and reconstruction module 
(IRR). 
Disaster risk governance and environmental migration 
This paper continues to build upon a current interest in disaster risk reduction at the global 
level (UNISDR and most large NGOs) and the role of migration from environmental shocks in 
this dynamic. Of note here is a shift to inclusion of local-level capacity formalised at the World 
Conference on Disaster Reduction in Japan (UNISDR, 2005), which launched the Hyogo 
Framework for Action around a risk management and resilience-building agenda. A quick 
reminder of how this has been articulated shows that each of the aims of Hyogo also promotes 
the way we can consider institutional reactions to migration resulting from environmental 
shocks. The action calls for: 
• the integration of disaster risk reduction into sustainable development policies and planning; 
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• development and strengthening of institutions, mechanisms and capacities to build resilience 
to hazards; 
• the systematic incorporation of risk reduction approaches into the implementation of 
emergency preparedness, response and recovery. 
World Conference of Disaster Reduction (WCDR, 2005) 
Achieving this throughout the migration sector may be a long way off, although it is pertinent to 
recognise that guidance notes promoted by UNISDR surface clearly not only in the IOM but 
also with UNHCR. Good examples of the application of some of the thinking behind the current 
UN stance iterated through WCDR (2005), though often still limited in global reach, include the 
work of organisations such as the Cyclone Preparedness Committees in Bangladesh (IFRC, 
2009; 2010), Practical Action (2010), La Red, Plan, Action Aid, Oxfam and others. These 
recognise population displacement aspects of disaster outcomes, but less obviously tackle 
questions of differential migration and hosting of the displaced from environmental crisis. The 
action research approaches for risk and resilience committees facilitated by the Disaster and 
Development Centre (DDC) initiatives in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Nepal reflect a 
community disaster reduction approach (Collins, 2009b). Whilst these have not specifically 
targeted forced migrants, the communities within which they have been active lie in post-
conflict areas where population displacement has been commonplace. What the more 
progressive examples of these approaches provide is a dialogue and actions at the local level 
that to varying degrees are devised and owned by those who will implement them, namely 
everyday occupants of the area at risk. Using this approach, a reaction to flee, migrate, stay, 
return and rebuild would remain a local matter but based on closely sensed and locally 
governed information and strategies. For example, the Cyclone Preparedness Committees in 
Bangladesh engage local citizens in disseminating alerts regarding cyclone risk levels and 
coordinate the opening of cyclone shelters to which people flee for shelter before the cyclone 
arrives. They hold meetings and report back to a network of committees, generating 
sensitisation for other state or NGO institutions that may be required. The cost is minimal, 
being that of mobilising a large number of volunteers. In interviews I carried out with members 
of the teams engaged in the warning exercises I found that they were not paid any money and 
received only very basic provisions, such as a loud-hailer. Those with prominent roles in the 
warning and informing process indicated they did so in part for the prestige it brought them in 
the community, or simply because they cared about it. 
The DDC-related work with urban risk committees in Mozambique experimented in the use of a 
further version of the approach to build community resilience to pervasive infectious disease 
risk, particularly diarrhoeal diseases. Community committee activities included the use of visual 
representation of what local people considered to be a risk in their neighbourhood, working on 
the basis that both a perceived or real risk was relevant to confronting the threats to community 
health (Williams et al., 2010). Risk committees then engage local authorities once their own 
assessment of a disease risk has been confirmed by environmental health scientists who are 
on hand to the community. Committees then own the process of implementing their solution to 
the risks confirmed (Collins, 2009b). In some instances this resulted in the improved and willing 
cleaning up of an entire area by the community and consequent reduction in health risks. 
However, not all risk and resilience committees are successful. The need for a financial 
resource rather than relying entirely on volunteerism and the presence of one or more highly 
motivated individuals at the core of a community committee are two of the features that have 
been reported to make a critical difference in this process. 
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The committees of this type in Nepal uncovered a further range of factors in group organisation 
that influence the local risk governance process, with higher success rates being found, but 
causes unproven, for committees more embedded in state government than functioning 
entirely independently (Jones et al., 2011, forthcoming). A core feature of the risk and 
resilience committee approach relevant to evacuation and migration preparedness is that they 
can be applied with common procedures in preparation for multiple types of oncoming 
environmental risk. A second key ingredient is that they can be active during times of relative 
normality with on-going community-strengthening activities, whilst also being ready to 
transform into response units when environmental shocks occur. It is suggested that they 
represent an approach that can address issues of migration in response to environmental 
shocks, either in warning and coordinating for those who will flee, or in preparing local 
communities to receive the displaced from other areas. Sensitisation to the needs of knowing 
risks, rights and responsibilities are central to this function, and best developed within the local 
ownership that a risk and resilience type social organisation can facilitate. 
In the case of Nepal, the Red Cross has begun to develop many of the functions of local 
committees in terms of emergency response. However, in the case of Mozambique, some 
difficulties in longer-term development of the approach for disease surveillance and control ran 
into difficulties through ministerial-level interference regarding the relevance of community 
based health actions of this type. Fortunately, the National Emergency Management Institute 
(INGC) moved on without reservations regarding community-based risk reduction approaches 
for environmental risks, and Mozambique currently has a system to this effect across rural 
areas most prone to flood. The experience of the risk and resilience community approach is 
that it can work without external funding, existing on the basis of locally motivating 
environmental issues. However, the expectation of local groups that engage in this type of 
action has often been that funds would be generated from somewhere. The precise formula 
that can ensure their sustainability and viability, including for adaptation to address 
environmental migrations, is hitherto untested. 
Managing displacement risks in advance of major shocks, rather than through emergency 
response post disaster, put simply is to follow the principle that prevention is better than cure. 
This section has suggested this is possible to realise should systems of risk governance be 
sensitised to the rights and needs of those who are at risk through their displacement. As risks 
of impoverishment reduce, disasters are avoided or their impacts mitigated through the 
migration process. However, reducing risks accumulation through environmental migration 
requires participation in avoiding the increase of vulnerable groups being, or ending up, in the 
wrong place at the wrong time without adequate forms of protection. Community-based 
approaches already appreciated in some civic forms of disaster relief and recovery are 
therefore now gaining more recognition as risk management strategies. International 
organisations keenly report community resilience principles, such as the IFRC (2002–2010), 
but this knowledge and experience appears to be remain separate from mechanisms for 
reacting to migrations from environmental shocks and trends, other than conceptual visibility in 
the IOM briefings. The community-based disaster risk reduction approach extends naturally, 
through its engagement of people first and people’s local governance of a process, to 
adaptation, planning, stabilisation and environmental protection processes. As implied by the 
IOM in its review of activities, these may be aspects of what it means to engage the migration 
management cycle. This would acknowledge the improvement in capacity and motivation of the 
citizen responder referred to earlier in this paper. It is balanced by recent re-emphasising of 
demand for greater community-based preparedness and risk reduction not only for its benefits 
as a cost-saving exercise (Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2005), but also as a morally and practically 
better way of engaging disaster mitigation. This is important to assessing institutional and 
governance needs related to environmental change and migration (Warner, 2010). 
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Selected operational mechanisms for 
reacting to environmental shocks in global 
migration 
The summary analysis in Table 1 outlines selected operational mechanisms for reacting to 
environmental shocks when putting migration into a disaster reduction frame as influenced by 
the principles derived so far in this paper. The selection of these mechanisms is not intended 
as comprehensive but is indicative of a field undergoing on-going development. As indicated in 
Table 1, they are the more specific mechanisms that emerge if developing detail from the IOM 
schema which uses themes of preventing, preparing, managing, mitigating impact and 
addressing migration as the components of a migration management cycle (IOM, 2010). The 
subsections that follow explore the consequences further.  
Early warning and engagement 
Early-warning actions in preventing and preparing for migration are those that seek to avoid or 
reduce potential negative impacts, modified to the extent that knowledge built from earlier 
events contributes to understanding how to prepare for those forthcoming. In the case of 
migration as an adaptive strategy to cope with environmental change, this could also function 
as early warning for optimal opportunities to migrate elsewhere during non-emergency. Early-
warning mechanisms have been encapsulated in what disaster managers refer to as a disaster 
management cycle moving between preparedness, relief and rehabilitation. Though cycles of 
this variant have been contested as limited in their resemblance of actual process (Frerks et 
al., 1995), as a conceptual and descriptive management aid the cycle is still perpetually 
referred to. The need to prepare for decision making before, during and after a disaster event is 
not in question. Prevention involves a contingency plan and this has been developed for mass 
migration emergencies (IOM, 2008).  
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Table 1:  Selected operational mechanisms in reacting to environmental shocks for 
migration contexts 
Operational mechanisms in reacting to environmental shocks 
Preventing and 
preparing for 
migration 
Managing and mitigating migration 
Addressing the effects 
of migration from 
shocks 
Early -warning 
engagement Reactions to risks Disaster communication Response standards 
i.e. Awareness to 
strengthen motivation 
and capacity to 
negotiate migration 
from environmental 
shocks 
Participation in early 
action through potential 
migrant and host 
capacity to address 
uncertainty in 
environmental systems 
Knowing when and how 
best to evacuate or stay 
put relative to changes 
in environmental risk, 
where necessary with 
improved risk 
assessment and early 
warning technologies 
i.e. Advanced 
interpretation and 
representation of migrant, 
non-migrant and host 
community reactions to 
risks and consequent 
implications 
Resourcefulness of 
potential migrants and 
understanding of culturally 
derived reactions under 
varying social economic 
and environmental 
contexts 
Inputs of ongoing risk 
assessment into 
sustainable risk 
management. Making 
global assistance pledges 
accountable 
Evaluation of risk 
governance contexts of 
environmental migrants, 
non-migrants and hosting 
communities 
i.e. Integrated communication 
to mediate reactions to 
environmental shocks for 
those who migrate, those who 
stay and those in hosting 
areas 
Locally, grounded information 
between those experiencing, 
those observing and those 
reporting reactions to 
environmental migrations 
Appropriate access to and 
use of communication 
technology 
Communicating past lessons 
to current circumstances for 
modified policy development 
Appropriate use of the media 
and other communication 
channels in environmental 
migration education 
i.e. Minimum and 
extended standards for 
contexts of environmental 
migration. 
Civil societal, and locally 
grounded management of 
emergency relief and 
recovery for the most 
vulnerable in areas of 
fleeing, migration routes 
and destinations 
Longer-term recovery and 
rehabilitation  
Migration as development 
oriented adaptation and 
disaster risk reduction 
through upholding of 
migrant and host rights. 
Honouring pledges for 
reconstruction in areas of 
environmental shock 
 
Early warning does not guarantee early action due to complex interpretational and 
communicational limitations addressed in the following subsections of this paper. Ultimately, 
preparedness challenges human organisation, vision and commitment as it involves working in 
preparation for ‘uncertain’ or unproven events. Resources to invest in preparedness are often 
difficult to source as the evidence base is incomplete, leading to potential loss of motivation for 
action amongst at risk groups. Politically it is difficult to invest in unseen risks rather than the 
more obvious and well-reported scenes that follow an environmental shock. The 
unpredictability of migration decisions adds to this ‘crisis of uncertainty’, complicating prediction 
capacity still further. The implication has been that the field of prevention and risk reduction 
remains distinctive for receiving wide interest and pledges of ideas or monetary support (such 
as through the Hyogo Accord of 2005), but remains to date with few to-scale financial 
investments, and many gaps in finding adequate technical solutions. 
Whilst the world rallied behind the Hyogo Accord following the reactions to the 2004 Indian 
Ocean Tsunami and other environmental disasters, and whilst there is increasing attention to 
potential environmental migrations, real investment in longer-term environmental disaster risk 
reduction remains elusive. Putting preparedness and its attendant early-warning and disaster 
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mitigation measures not only requires further examination in terms of mainstreaming migration, 
but also awaits combinations of knowledge and technology development, political will and 
behaviour more widely. Each factor can be driven by the other, so one way forward is to 
facilitate education and awareness of disaster and development migration linkages for a more 
informed early-warning approach. 
With regard to community preparedness in environmental hazard mitigation, one of the 
questions raised through the work referred to earlier in Mozambique and Nepal is whether the 
most at-risk members of a group have sufficient motivation, or can be adequately empowered, 
for protective actions in advance. This is because where poverty is a daily pressure, people 
focus on the immediate needs they experience, rather than on longer-term speculative ones 
they do not currently experience. We know from this that migrant and host group engagement 
with risk reduction will require linking activities that make preparedness worthwhile in the short 
term. This is the rationale behind Figure 1, which shows that community engagement in 
effective early warning requires inclusion of community development and well-being 
aspirations. For example, the groups engaged in the risk and resilience work in Mozambique 
and Nepal and to some extent the Cyclone Preparedness Programme in Bangladesh were 
active in seeking small-scale asset gains in carrying out their work for their committees, either 
economic or social, though these could be environmental or political gains in other contexts. 
However, the variability in propensity of different types of migrant, non-migrant or hosting group 
to engage in early preparedness is not known, even if the motivational well-being opportunities 
may be a likely way of achieving it. Furthermore, it is important to consider that the simplified 
representation of community involvement in early warning and development through a well-
being driver takes place within culturally and politically specific contexts that vary from place to 
place and over time. The model is suggested as resonant with successful migrant adaptation 
processes. The well-being driver within refugee groups is a potential vast arena to consider, 
b) Community involvement in early warning and development 
Build Risk Early warning 
Improve well-
being, motivate 
people 
Build knowledge, 
capacity and 
resilience 
Verify 
indicators, 
improve 
technology
a) Community involvement in early warning 
Figure 1:  The basis of community-based early warning.  
Source: Author, in IFRC World Disasters Report (2009, p. 43). 
Early warning, 
action and 
response 
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involving economic, social, environmental and psychological domains (Jayawickrama, 2010). 
For simplification it can be considered here to reflect well-known aspirations of internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) and refugee groups internationally to engage in regular life skills and 
livelihoods even in the most extreme cases of physical and mental deprivation. Alternatively, in 
developmental terms it can also be considered as the investment in poverty reduction that 
offsets the impact of adverse environmental change, rather then removing environmental 
change.  
Reactions to risk 
Reactions to environmental risks vary from situation to situation dependent on experiences of 
previous events, perceptions of risks, personality, levels of dependency on resources, 
communication and interpretational issues. The way risks have been conceptualised is 
notoriously influential on the way interventions may develop. However, there is also a 
longstanding cultural controversy concerning environmental disasters as either ‘acts of God or 
acts of man’ (O’Keefe et al., 1976). An associated fundamental viewpoint is that no disaster is 
in effect a natural disaster (Cannon, 1994). They are unnatural in that mass fatality is never 
inevitable should there be the capability of being in the right place, at the right time with 
adequate forms of protection (Collins, 2009a). In this respect capacity is an overriding theme 
that tends to determine ultimately much of the progress in disaster reduction (Wisner et al., 
2004). Of interest here for the case of migrants is that ‘displaced’ groups have frequently been 
associated with resourcefulness (Haines, 2010), a phenomenon that extends to not only 
regulating their own livelihoods but also contributing to the opportunities of host communities 
(Jacobsen, 2002). 
At the institutional level, further challenges are in the moral, political and scientifically guided 
decisions in relation to level of impact of an environmental shock and certainty about its 
occurrence (Table 2). Terms of engagement in these reactions and policy rationales will vary 
across different contexts and institutional links to the event. It is important to note that Table 2 
represents only a very basic conceptualisation of the decision-making domain where there are 
trade-offs between higher and lower impacts under varying conditions of certainty. The point 
here is to demonstrate a range of potential reaction positions alongside implied and contrasting 
policy rationales. Analysts will recognise examples of disasters and displacement events they 
have accompanied as variously fitting parts of this representation. There is no intention here to 
brand any particular event within this; it is accepted that categorisation in this respect could be 
hugely subjective. It is also acknowledged that environmental crises involving migration may at 
different stages of the unfolding event be represented by varying parts of the matrix.  
Financial investment as a reaction to global risk has additional dimensions to those implied in 
Table 1. For example, there is much greater investment in the more politically active arena of 
climate change adaptation than other forms of disaster risk reduction despite uncertainty about 
climate. Driving this is the fear of migration of some governments, particularly that high 
numbers of Africans might be pushed by climate change into Europe, and Mexicans to the 
United States. However, few sound data exist to show how many people really might move in 
this way as a consequence of overall climate change. For example, whilst the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) has indicated that, by 2080, 1.1–
3.2 billion people will be experiencing water scarcity, 200 –600 million hunger and 2–7 million 
coastal flooding, estimations of an additional 250 million people being permanently displaced 
by climate change phenomena alone by 2050 are speculative and admitted to assume 
continued current trends. Most agencies avoid providing current figures but quote likely future 
figures, further demonstrating limitations in the current definition of environmental migrant. For 
now, evidence is more specifically available with regard to those people who are displaced 
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either temporarily or longer term by rapid-onset events, some of which may be becoming more 
frequent as a result of climate change, such as flash floods and cyclones. The indirect impacts 
over the longer term, such as worsening food security in arid areas, though a genuine pressure 
of climate change, remain difficult to assess because of the mitigating effects of adaptation and 
the drive to remain in situ not being fully known. 
Table 2: Characteristic migration related reactions and policy rationales under varying 
conditions of certainty and environmental impact 
 Higher potential impact Lower potential impact 
Higher 
certainty 
Characteristic reaction: 
Focus on short-term and more visible 
migration impacts with limited investment 
in underlying vulnerability and 
development issues 
Characteristic policy rationale: 
Mitigate likely impacts on known 
vulnerable migrant groups. Resilience 
building, well-being, poverty reduction 
and development progress as additional 
actions where feasible 
Characteristic reaction: 
Moral and political awareness of migrant 
and other issues submerged. Low 
intervention investment accompanied by 
non-action for ‘acceptable’ risks of 
‘minority’ concern 
Characteristic policy rationale: 
Use evidence base to reduce 
environmental threat, and negotiate 
longer-term adaptations, well-being or 
poverty reduction 
Lower 
certainty 
Characteristic reaction: 
Lack of motivation and precautionary 
investment to crucial areas of migration. 
Occasional misdirected reactions due to 
uncertainty 
Characteristic policy rationale: 
Develop knowledge and understanding 
of complex impact on and consequences 
of migration. Opportunity for diplomacy, 
rights and moralistic persuasion with 
potential of political opportunism 
Characteristic reaction: 
Slower-onset and ‘lower impact’ crisis is 
considered status quo with acceptable 
levels of unknown migration risk 
Characteristic policy rationale: 
Concord with available knowledge and 
development broadly mindful of 
underlying condition of resilience and 
well-being, including potential of poverty 
reduction and development. Migration 
only partially considered 
 
Whilst the science of climate and related environmental hazards remains at times patchy, albeit 
it is clear that change is occurring, some level of certainty is readily available with regard to the 
effects of local environmental changes on varying conditions of human vulnerability. It is 
important to consider here that displaced people who may be economically impoverished often 
gather, or are gathered, in areas of higher environmental risk (Black, 1998; Collins, 1998). The 
poorest are more exposed to environmental hazards, and hence vulnerability and poverty 
reduction mitigates disaster impact (Pelling, 2003; Bankhoff et al., 2004; Wisner et al., 2004; 
Collins, 2009a). The relationship between poverty and impact of an environmental shock led to 
increasing convergence of disaster risk reduction as emphasised by the Hyogo Accord of 2005, 
poverty reduction as emphasised by the Millennium Development Goals, and climate change 
adaptation (Collins, 2009a; Pelling, 2010). Multiple international organisations increasingly 
recognise the interconnections including the UN, World Bank and national-level strategies. In 
contexts of poverty, disaster risk reduction, sustainable development and climate change 
adaptation are largely aspects of the same agenda of survival and a struggle for more even 
development, intergenerational equity and aspirations of well-being for current and future 
generations. The ability to view this in terms of a human migration context potentially revitalises 
global reactions to these global policy drivers regardless of the levels of certainty that may be 
possible. 
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Disaster communication  
Communication also mediates reactions to environmental shocks. State-of-the-art 
communications are those that preserve the integrity of the message being communicated. 
From the ground-level site of a displacement, those engaged in the research process 
increasingly have learned to apply participatory technologies to be able to gather and 
communicate information (multiple sources describe this, but see Pelling, 2007; IFRC, 2010;). 
What can be communicated is only as good as the interpretation of the situation through 
assessments at the scene of the events. A further advance in the techniques of crisis 
communication lies in the ability to transmit information in real time and the accessibility of 
multiple actors, including emergency migrants themselves, to engage in communication at a 
global level. However, hazards, risks, vulnerabilities, adaptation processes and the capacity to 
deal with environmental shocks and associated migration are subject to how all of these are 
represented in the wider chain of communication. Questions in disaster communication can be 
reduced to who informs and who is informed, and what techniques are available to transmit 
sensible and interpretable information. This is particularly important with regard to the role of 
the media and the reactions they are capable of inducing (Vasterman et al., 2005). Since the 
way information is portrayed and received determines the reaction that may result, risk 
perception studies play an important role in understanding how people reduce or ignore risk 
(Adams, 1995; Slovic, 2000) and the distancing of risk through modernisation (after Beck, 
1992). Further in-depth work is currently being compiled on disaster communication questions 
by an international research group coordinated by the Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies at 
Bielefeld University, Germany (ZiF, 2011). The question of communicating trust is central to 
many of the issues being exposed (Stephenson, 2005; Longstaff and Young, 2008). 
Communication underpins the capacity for early-warning engagement as outlined earlier. 
information communication technology (ICT) now allows environmental shocks to be known 
about instantly throughout the world, providing access to a higher percentage of people. It is 
also a tool for those surviving the environmental shocks, to trace each other across dispersal 
landscapes. Some recent environmental emergencies, such as our cited cases of New 
Orleans, Haiti, Pakistan and Japan, have all witnessed the adoption of mobile communication 
technology as a reaction mechanism. It was used to make contact with families and in some 
instances to warn of further risks to come. The mobile phone and social media more widely 
have ushered in a communication environment in which both those displaced by environmental 
shock and observers can interact with each other and with the media in a manner that was not 
possible until recent times. Some relief NGOs now engage in providing communications 
services for survivors and refugee groups. Communication capacity changes the dynamic in 
the dialogue among those experiencing, those observing and those reporting more formally on 
environmental events. For longer-term displacements and migrations, once the main media 
interest has subsided, communication technology remains the tool by which migrants can 
network their reactions and decision making. 
Humanitarian standards in disaster response 
Inevitably, despite the ideal of prevention and risk reduction, reactions to larger environmental 
shocks need to engage emergency relief. In the analysis of operational mechanisms included 
here migrants are often already taken more into the frame for relief than they are for prevention 
strategies. To avoid a haphazard approach to relief that leads to criticisms of the limitations in 
the industry, measures have been taken to produce guidelines and minimum standards 
(Oxfam, 1995; MSF, 1997; Sphere, 2004; and others). These include standards for immediate 
needs people have when an environmental shock has caused major destitution. They include 
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the primary subsistence ingredients of nutrition, water, sanitation, shelter and fuel. The case of 
Haiti revealed that security from theft and abuse must also be added to this list together with 
further criteria, such as wider health requirements and communications facilities. Reference to 
the rights of refugees is apparent in the Humanitarian Charter, reiterated through Sphere in 
terms of the right to non-refoulement (i.e. not to be sent back). The MSF humanitarian text is 
specifically orientated to refugee situations, and similarly the Oxfam approach to emergency 
relief. However, minimum standards often remain unattainable in many humanitarian crises 
involving mass displacements both rapid and slow onset, albeit with distinct differences 
between the two. This is because for more rapid-onset events displaced people may be out of 
reach of immediate relief or not represented as sufficiently a high priority to attract attention, 
and for slow-onset events they may become seen as an inevitable and ‘acceptable’ level of 
outcome. In these contexts, receipt of regular assistance can rarely be assumed. 
Minimum standards as portrayed by the agencies might be less appropriate to some contexts 
or in more extreme circumstances if the standards are not locally derived. What therefore might 
be the basis of a minimum standard for contexts as contrasting as Somalia and populations 
displaced to the UK? A further problem is that when migrations are also associated with 
contexts of political violence rather than environmental shocks alone, there may be deliberate 
worsening of standards if a migrant group ends up on the wrong side of a political divide. 
Minimum standards in these contexts become more fundamentally about protecting rights 
through humanitarian action (IASC, 2002). There is evidence that local players can manage 
standards and delivery of humanitarian aid effectively where suitable emergency management 
governance is in place. This also helps address the problems of dependency and declining 
international interest once supporting agencies go home (Crisp, 2005), and in viewing the right 
level of recognition of displaced people’s own adaptation strategies. 
In summary, minimum standards for displaced people are now well realised by aid agencies, 
but are not necessarily adhered to when logistics do not allow or resources are not sufficiently 
abundant. Through involving the idea of a humanitarian charter, standards ultimately need to 
extend to a rights-based approach for disaster risk reduction and development opportunities, 
not just in terms of relief. However, limitations are that both preventative risk reduction and 
long-term recovery are likely to remain less well supported than short-term emergency relief, 
and the latter can be confined to those who migrate. A growing problem is that pledges for 
long-term reconstruction assistance following some disasters events are not being honoured. 
In the case of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, from which there were at least 160,000 deaths 
and 2 million people in need of assistance, many of them temporary or longer-term migrants, 
the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly estimated the world to have pledged over 
US$8 billion of relief and longer-term assistance during the short-term aftermath. However, 1 
year later only 2% of this response had actually been delivered (Council of Europe, 2005). 
Many (it is not known how many) in the regions affected remain displaced from their original 
rebuild aspirations. Reactions to environmental shocks where there is only immediate relief 
does little to reintegrate sustainable development and bring security in contexts of future 
displacement risks. The 2010 earthquake in Haiti and floods of Pakistan, amongst other 
events, have already demonstrated this. 
Conclusions 
This paper has analysed mechanisms for reacting to migration associated with environmental 
shocks drawing from people-centred principles of disaster risk reduction and response. A basic 
framework suggested as central to the analysis of appropriate reactions was supplemented 
with a number of operational mechanisms that form a part of this approach. The consequences 
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of not applying a framework of principles along these lines are that understanding of 
environmental migration and its associated reactions, means to mitigation and options for 
addressing the outcomes would lack appropriate orientation. Further, there would be a lack of 
attention to extensive conceptualisation informed by the direct experiences of dealing with 
extreme events. Application of these principles should help avoid misrepresentation of 
environmental migration priorities.  
Reactions to environmental shocks depend on the nature of the event, and the circumstances 
and profiles of those displaced or otherwise affected. Key concerns are exposure to higher-risk 
places by more economically vulnerable groups and the resultant dynamics that develop 
through displacement. Transitions in health security, capacity, rights, resilience and adaptability 
mediate changes in risk, and are fields that can be effectively engaged. This demands inter-
sectoral and interdisciplinary work, although combinations of governmental departments and 
external agencies would naturally need to vary from crisis to crisis and country to country. No 
reaction is appropriate if it is not grounded in the local reality of citizen first responders. This 
was evidenced by an apparent policy lacuna in this aspect regarding reactions dealing with 
recent emergencies involving mass displacements in China, Haiti, Pakistan and other 
environmental disaster-struck locations. Short-term reactions are rarely balanced by long-term 
investments in recovery. With respect to displaced people’s adaptation to change, whether 
assisted or not, there is further doubt as to whether returning a situation to a previous ‘norm’ is 
helpful. Forcibly displaced migrant adaptation strategies, as observable for voluntary migrant 
strategies, can be considered in terms of their role as the potential longer-term recovery 
strategy. Any assistance or relief in this sense becomes support to a migrant’s own aspirations 
towards strategic improvement of well-being. Adjustments in relation to these challenges to 
existing norms of prevention and response cultures in relation to environmental shocks 
requires on-going reviews of disaster risk governance in migration contexts. 
There are multiple definitions and classifications that can be ascribed to migration in relation to 
environmental shock. Though this paper has chosen not to labour already well-worn debates 
regarding classification of different types of migrant and displaced person, it has been 
important to reflect migration that occurs variously with both ‘slow’-onset and rapid-onset 
events. Slow-onset environmental change can also produce characteristics of shock unfolding 
slowly, albeit realisation of a crisis can happen rapidly. Uncertainty about the full impact of 
many environmental events and consequent human migratory reactions exposes a need for a 
lot more in-depth research. For example, knowing more about why the same environment 
shock can produce variable individual relocation and emergency response reactions for groups 
of otherwise relatively similar people could assist future disaster mitigation efforts. Further, 
there are gender, age, experiential and educational influences in crisis decision making but 
little clarity as to the role of these differentials with respect to migration and hosting effects of 
migrations.  
The paper has presented principles and adapted operating mechanisms learned from practice, 
though in part interpreted theoretically. The principles are reflections of what has become 
known as relevant to people operating from local communities, the lay practice, and does not 
necessarily always fit with formalised emergency management. Whilst migration contexts 
already constitute complexity, it is suggested that much of what is presented here, rather than 
merely adding disaster reduction ideas to the mix, are more so the latent issues stemming from 
within the issue of reacting to environmental migrations. This may mean the meta-narratives 
offered currently by the IOM in this field are to some extent now reflecting well-realised links 
and connections from scholarly work. However, little in-depth literature to date appears to fully 
analyse the summative observations offered here.  
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Beyond community-based initiatives, such as the risk and resilience committees referred to in 
this paper, progress also needs to extend to adjustments in state and international policies. For 
example, this needs to address the designated status of future environmentally displaced 
people in order that human security in these contexts is a nationally and internationally 
governed right. Variable responses occur across cultures of formal and informal emergency 
management subject to contrasting development needs. Preparedness, early warning, civic or 
national policy, and accountable humanitarian response merely guide mechanisms in reacting 
to environmental shocks. Whilst people react to risk variably, timing and nuances of 
communication influence the nature of risk reaction, response and longer-term resilience 
building. Technological development enabling the rise of real-time and socially orientated 
media is altering the terrain of access, understanding and reacting to major crisis events, these 
being constructed and deconstructed by those who must interpret the messages conveyed. 
Migration is well recognised as a sensitive social, economic and political phenomenon for the 
media so that its representation in relation to environmental crisis can be presumed also open 
to good and bad representations as in other contexts. 
Both research and systemic capacity in this field would appear to be in its infancy, in effect 
amounting to global-level indictments of being to some extent forewarned of the general, but on 
the whole unprepared for the specific. For example, early warning in countries of 
environmentally induced migration would require the capacity to know people’s predisposition 
to migrate under different levels of environmental pressure. Once the effect of environmental 
shocks set in, humanitarian mechanisms that follow may continue to be needed short-term or 
for protracted periods, requiring on-going guidelines for disaster response. However, common 
standards rights and responsibilities in relation to environmental shocks are likely to remain 
contested in an uneven world.  
We have ample evidence throughout history that sustainable development reduces the impact 
of environmental shocks, and that disaster risk reduction can improve the likelihood of 
sustainable futures. This also suggests there is much to be gained from the adage ‘getting 
development out of disaster’. Principles presented here should assist the aspirations of those 
effected by environmental shocks to ‘build back better’ (Monday, 2002; UNICEF, 2005) and this 
is applicable for those who move, those in host areas and those who stay behind. It requires a 
vision for future actions beyond merely reacting to vulnerability and displacement, to realising 
aspirations for well-being and sustainability. 
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